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The Machinery of Decline

A civilization capable of inventing new things is not necessarily capable of sustaining the things it has already invented.

An Alaska Airlines Boeing 737 Max 8 sit at gate at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) in Queens, New York City on August 10, 2026.
An Alaska Airlines Boeing 737 Max 8 sit at gate at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) in Queens, New York City on August 10, 2026. — Credit: (Getty Images)

Somewhere in the United States, there is a machine that has been running since Richard Nixon was president. It has survived Watergate, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the invention of the internet, and several successive declarations that history has ended. It may be responsible for keeping airplanes from colliding with one another. It may require a floppy disk. Nobody is entirely sure how to replace it without causing something terrible to happen.

This is the peculiar achievement of American modernity. The country that invented the future has become increasingly dependent on the past. Its billionaires are building artificial intelligence systems that promise to surpass human cognition, while parts of its public infrastructure remain trapped in the technological imagination of the Carter administration. Somewhere, an engineer is teaching a machine to reason. Somewhere else, another engineer is trying to find a replacement part for a computer whose manufacturer went out of business before he was born.

The recent FAA outage offered another reminder of this strange arrangement. Rick DeLaTorre, a former senior CIA operations officer, pointed to the persistence of systems built in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, some of which remain essential to the functioning of American aviation. The people maintaining these systems may be younger than the machines themselves. They are custodians of an increasingly unfamiliar technological civilization, charged with keeping alive devices whose original designers are probably retired or dead.

There is something almost touching about this. In another context, we might call it conservation. The ancient Romans built aqueducts that continued supplying water for centuries. Medieval cathedrals were constructed over generations, with craftsmen inheriting the unfinished work of their grandfathers. America has achieved a similar continuity with magnetic storage media and obsolete computer terminals. Its monuments to permanence are machines that everyone agrees should have been replaced twenty years ago.

But the comparison breaks down. The Romans maintained their aqueducts because they understood what they were for. American infrastructure survives through a mixture of institutional inertia, improvisation, and the terrifying possibility that changing anything might make matters worse.

A modern civilization is an extraordinary accumulation of things that almost nobody understands. You board an airplane because you trust the pilot, who trusts the instruments, which depend on communications networks, electrical systems, software, and equipment maintained by thousands of people you will never meet. Each part of the system rests on another part. Eventually, somewhere near the bottom, you find a computer that still remembers the first Bush administration.

The whole arrangement works remarkably well, until it doesn’t.

Political arguments about infrastructure usually concern money. One party wants to spend more, the other wants to spend less, and both assume that sufficient expenditure will eventually produce a functioning bridge. But the problem is more interesting than that. America is fabulously wealthy. It can mobilize trillions of dollars in a crisis. It can develop astonishing technologies, construct immense private fortunes, and persuade investors to assign extraordinary valuations to companies that have yet to produce a profit. What it increasingly struggles to do is maintain the ordinary material conditions of collective life.

This is a problem of political attention. A new project has a ribbon-cutting ceremony. A functioning maintenance schedule has nothing. Politicians can stand beside a gleaming new terminal and announce that they are building the future. Nobody wins an election by explaining that an obscure electrical component has been replaced before it failed.

Maintenance is the least glamorous form of civilization. It demands foresight, patience, and a willingness to spend money on disasters that have not yet happened. Its greatest successes are invisible. The bridge stays standing. The lights stay on. The aircraft lands. Nothing occurs, and nobody notices.

Consequently, the American state has developed an almost theological relationship with catastrophe. Disaster is the revelation through which previously invisible necessities become visible. A system fails, officials discover that it was old, Congress holds hearings, consultants are hired, and a modernization initiative is announced. The initiative then enters the same bureaucratic machinery that allowed the original problem to develop.

There is another, darker dimension to this arrangement. The machinery that keeps America functioning is no longer entirely American.

DeLaTorre has warned about the country’s dependence on foreign components in electrical systems, energy production, communications, and other critical industries. He cited reports of Chinese-made transformers containing equipment capable of remote communication, raising concerns about who might ultimately have access to essential infrastructure. Such reports require careful technical scrutiny; foreign manufacture alone does not establish hostile control. But the underlying strategic problem is real enough. A country that cannot reliably produce, inspect, maintain, or replace the machinery on which it depends has surrendered a measure of its independence.

For several decades, American political and economic elites treated supply chains as an exercise in arithmetic. If a component could be manufactured more cheaply somewhere else, there was little reason to make it at home. The logic was elegant. Specialization would make everyone richer. Interdependence would make conflict irrational. Commerce would dissolve the old antagonisms between nations. Unfortunately, nations have remained stubbornly interested in power.

A transformer is an exceptionally boring object until somebody realizes that disabling enough of them could produce a national emergency. A semiconductor is merely a commodity until its absence shuts down production. A communications system is simply a convenience until an adversary finds a way to interfere with it. The same global network that made goods cheaper has also created new opportunities for coercion.

This does not mean that every imported component is a weapon or that economic self-sufficiency is either possible or desirable. It means that strategic dependence is a political fact, even when economists prefer to describe it as an efficiency.

For years, Americans were encouraged to believe that the material foundations of national power had become obsolete. Manufacturing was yesterday’s economy. Software was tomorrow’s. The highest form of economic activity was the manipulation of information, preferably from a comfortable office with exposed brickwork and complimentary sparkling water.

Factories closed. Industrial knowledge disappeared. The people who understood how to make certain things retired without successors. The country became extraordinarily good at designing systems and increasingly dependent on other countries to manufacture their physical components. Meanwhile, the physical world continued to exist.

It is possible to spend an entire career discussing artificial intelligence, digital transformation, and the coming technological singularity without thinking very much about electrical transformers. Yet every server farm depends on electricity. Every digital utopia requires cooling systems, transmission lines, replacement parts, and people willing to repair them at three in the morning. The supposedly immaterial economy rests on a vast and decidedly material foundation. This is perhaps the defining absurdity of our age: we have confused technological novelty with technological competence.

A civilization capable of inventing new things is not necessarily capable of sustaining the things it has already invented. Indeed, the two activities demand different virtues. Innovation rewards disruption, impatience, and the willingness to abandon established arrangements. Maintenance requires continuity, institutional memory, and respect for accumulated knowledge. The first produces spectacular fortunes and magazine covers. The second produces another uneventful Tuesday. America has become exceptionally skilled at celebrating the former and neglecting the latter.

There is a temptation to understand this as another familiar story of national decline. The republic grows old, its institutions become decadent, and eventually the barbarians arrive. But the more unsettling possibility is that the country remains immensely powerful while gradually losing control of the systems that make its power possible.

Its aircraft carriers still sail. Its financial markets still dominate the world. Its technology companies still promise miracles. Yet behind these achievements lies an infrastructure of aging equipment, fragmented responsibility, and dependencies accumulated over decades without much consideration of their strategic consequences.

The danger is unlikely to announce itself in a single dramatic collapse. More probably, it will arrive as a succession of small humiliations. Another outage. Another delayed flight. Another emergency appropriation. Another discovery that some essential component is unavailable, or that only a handful of specialists still know how a system works.

Each incident will be treated as an isolated failure. Together, they describe a civilization that has forgotten the difference between possessing extraordinary capabilities and being able to depend on them.

The solution will require money, certainly. It will also require something rarer: a political culture capable of taking the ordinary seriously. A country that wants to remain powerful must be able to maintain its bridges, secure its electrical grid, train its engineers, and understand the machinery it imports. It must treat resilience as an achievement worth pursuing before the emergency arrives.

There is no great mystery here. The future will still need people who know how to keep the lights on.

And somewhere in America, an ancient computer continues humming in a government building. It has outlived several presidents, several technological revolutions, and every fashionable theory about the disappearance of the physical world. It asks for very little. A stable power supply, an occasional replacement part, and perhaps one more floppy disk. For now, the machine still works. That is precisely why nobody has replaced it.

Reading time: 8 min